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Despite the massive investments in information security technologies and research over           
the past decades, the information security industry is still immature. In particular, the             
prioritization of remediation efforts within vulnerability management programs        
predominantly relies on a mixture of subjective expert opinion, severity scores, and            
incomplete data. Compounding the need for prioritization is the increase in the number of              
vulnerabilities the average enterprise has to remediate. This paper produces the first open,             
data-driven framework for assessing vulnerability threat, that is, the probability that a            
vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the first twelve months after public              
disclosure. This scoring system has been designed to be simple enough to be             
implemented by practitioners without specialized tools or software, yet provides accurate           
estimates of exploitation. Moreover, the implementation is flexible enough that it can be             
updated as more, and better, data becomes available. We call this system the Exploit              
Prediction Scoring System, EPSS.  
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Introduction 
Despite the massive investments in information security technologies and research over the past decades, 
the industry is still immature.  In particular, the ability to assess the risk of a software vulnerability relies 1
predominantly on incomplete data, and basic characteristics of the vulnerability, rather than on 
data-driven processes and empirical observations. The consequences of this are many. First, it prevents 
firms and network defenders from efficiently prioritizing software patches, wasting countless hours and 
resources remediating vulnerabilities that could be delayed, or conversely delaying remediation of critical 
vulnerabilities. In addition, policy makers and government agencies charged with overseeing critical 
infrastructure sectors are unable to defensibly marshall resources or warn citizens about the potential 
changes in adversary threats from a newly discovered vulnerability.  
A common approach to prioritizing vulnerability remediation is based on characterizing the severity of a 
given vulnerability, often by using the internationally recognized CVSS, the Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System (ITU-1521).  CVSS computes the severity of a vulnerability as a function of its 2
characteristics, and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact to an information system. The 
CVSS specification is clear that the Base score, the most commonly used component, is not meant to 
reflect the overall risk. Consequently, it does not measure threat or the probability that a vulnerability will 
be used to attack a network.   3
Nevertheless, it has been mis-interpreted by some organizations as a faithful measure of cyber security 
risk, and become a ​de facto ​standard when prioritizing remediation efforts. For example, the payment card 
industry data security standard (PCI-DSS) requires that vulnerabilities greater than 4.0 must be 
remediated by organizations storing or processing credit cards (PCI, 2018), and in 2019 the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) released a binding operational directive requiring federal agencies to remediate 
high and critical vulnerabilities according to the CVSS standard.   4
While the vulnerability severity component is addressed by CVSS, a critical gap in the information 
security field is a proper measure and forecast of threat, which is what this research seeks to address. 
1 Estimates suggest a worldwide cyber security market over $170 billion dollars by 2024. See 
https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/cyber-security-market-size-is-expected-to-surpass-us-170-billion-by-20
24-2019-04-23 
2 See https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.1521-201104-I/en. 
3 The Temporal metric group includes a metric for the presence of an exploit, it does not account for whether the 
vulnerability is actively being exploited.  
4 See Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 19-02, https://cyber.dhs.gov/bod/19-02/. 
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Specifically, we improve on previous work by Jacobs et al (2019) in a number of important ways. First, 
we employ a modeling technique (logistic regression) that is more transparent, intuitive and easily 
implemented. In any information security process, multiple stakeholders will necessarily need to 
understand and act on the output - IT operations, security, business stakeholders. A model therefore needs 
to be interoperable and a score change must be explainable and attributed to any one feature. Second, as 
inputs to the model we only use data that are publicly available, easily discoverable​, ​or are otherwise 
unrestricted. Finally, we formalize the regression coefficients into a scoring system that can be automated 
and implemented with simple and widely available tools (such as a spreadsheet). Overall, we develop the 
first open, data-driven threat scoring system for predicting the probability that a vulnerability will be 
exploited within the 12 months following public disclosure.  
We believe this scoring system has the opportunity for making a fundamental contribution to the 
information security field not just as a way to help network defenders more efficiently allocate resources, 
but also for policy makers in communicating the actual threat of computer vulnerabilities. 
The next section discusses related literature, followed by a description of the datasets used in this 
research. We then present our estimating model, results, and formalize our probabilistic vulnerability 
scoring system. We conclude with a discussion on limitations and conclusion. 
Related Literature 
This paper draws on a research related to the incentives and tradeoffs of information security investments, 
markets (criminal and otherwise), and processes related to understanding and improving how firms and 
organizations protect against cyber security threats. It also extends previous academic and industry 
computer and security-related scoring systems. 
Most directly, this paper extends research by Jacobs et al (2019) which developed a machine learning 
model for estimating the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited. It also contributes to a growing 
body of specialized research that use different machine learning techniques to predict when a 
vulnerability will be exploited. While some papers use proof of concept (published exploit) code as their 
outcome measure (Bozorgi et al, 2010; Edkrantz and Said, 2015; Bullough et al, 2017; Almukaynizi et al, 
2017) others use real-world exploit data (Sabottke et al, 2015), as is done in this paper.  
Providing useful assessments of the threat of a given vulnerability (i.e. threat scoring) has been 
notoriously difficult, either from academics or industry coalitions. For example, while CVSS has become 
an industry standard for assessing fundamental characteristics of vulnerabilities, the Base score (and 
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accompanying metrics) captures fundamental properties of a vulnerability and the subsequent impact to 
an information system from a successful attack. The Temporal metrics of CVSS, on the other hand, are 
meant to capture time-varying properties of a vulnerability, such as the maturity of exploit code, and 
available patching. However, the Temporal metrics have enjoyed much lower adoption, likely due to the 
fact that they require organizations to update the information, as well as made judgements based on threat 
intelligence or other exploit data sources, something which has proven difficult to accomplish. In 
addition, and most relevant to this work, while the metrics seek to capture notions of vulnerability threat, 
they are not informed by any data-driven or empirical estimates. These two limitations (absence of an 
authoritative entity to update the metric values, and lack of data to inform the score), are key contributions 
of this work. 
In addition, Microsoft created the Exploitability Index in 2008  in order to provide customers information 5
about the exploitability of vulnerabilities targeting Microsoft software.  The Threat index provides a 6
qualitative (ordinal) rating from 0 (“exploitation detected” – the highest score), to 3 (“exploitation 
unlikely” – the lowest score). In 2011, the Index was updated to distinguish between current and past 
application versions, and to capture the ability for the exploit to cause either a temporary or repeated 
denial of service of the application. Importantly, this effort was a closed, Microsoft-only service, and so 
neither provided any transparency into it’s algorithm, nor included exploitability scores for other software 
products. By contrast, this effort is designed to be an open and transparent scoring system that considers 
all platforms and applications for which there exist publicly known vulnerabilities (i.e. CVEs).  
Data 
The data used in this research relates to vulnerabilities published in a two-year window between June 1, 
2016 and June 1, 2018 which includes 25,159 vulnerabilities. Published vulnerability information is 
collected from MITRE’s Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) and includes the CVE identifier, 
description and references to external websites  discussing or describing the vulnerability.  Data was also 7
collected from NIST’s National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and includes the CVSS base severity 
5 Estimated launch date based on information from 
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/ecostrat/2008/11/13/one-month-analysis-exploitability-index/​. Last accessed 
July 5th, 2019. Further, there is some discussion that the original index was specifically meant (or at least 
communicated) to capture the likelihood of exploit ​within 30 days from patch release​, however, this qualification is 
not explicitly mentioned on the website. 
6 See ​https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/exploitability-index​. Last accessed July 5th, 2019. 
7 See ​https://cve.mitre.org/data/refs/index.html 
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score, and the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) information, which provides information about the 
affected products, platforms and vendors.  
We also derived and assigned descriptive tags about each vulnerability by retrieving the text from 
references present in each CVE. We extracted common multiword expressions from the raw text using 
Rapid Automatic Keyword Extraction (Rose et al, 2010) and manually culled and normalized a list of 191 
tags  encoded as binary features for each vulnerability.  Our goal was to capture attributes and concepts 8 9
practitioners use in the field to describe vulnerabilities (such as “code execution” and “privilege 
escalation”).  The manual review was necessary to normalize disparate phrasings of the same general 
concept (e.g.  “SQLi” and “SQL injection” or a “buffer overflow” vs “buffer overrun”).  
We collect information about whether proof-of-concept exploit code or weaponized exploits exists. 
Exploit code was extracted from Exploit DB. While weaponized exploits were found by looking at the 
modules in Rapid 7’s Metasploit framework, D2 Security’s Elliot Framework and the Canvas 
Exploitation Framework.  
The critical outcome variable, information about whether the vulnerability was exploited in the wild 
comes from a number of sources. Specifically, we collect data from Proofpoint, Fortinet, AlienVault and 
GreyNoise . In total, we acquired 921 observations of recorded exploitations used in the wild within the 10
window of study.  This represents an overall exploitation rate of  3.7%.  Extra care was taken in collecting 
this variable to ensure it was limited to exploitations within the first twelve months after the CVE was 
published.   This requirement and availability of data across all the data sources is what established the 
window of study to be between June 1st, 2016 and June 1st, 2018 (we discuss more on this below).  
Feature Selection  
We observe from our dataset that some variables are incredibly sparse (including some that are 
completely separable), or are highly correlated with other variables, and so the inclusion of these features, 
which could lead to biased model parameters, and unnecessary complexity (Allison, 2008). Therefore, we 
applied a 3-stage set of criteria for including features into the model. In Stage 1, we filtered out all 
8 Only 166 of the 191 matched the vulnerabilities within our sample.  
9 An alternative approach is the familiar ‘bag of words’ however we found this method to be less effective. 
10 We note that these are closed sources for the outcome variable. Our goal is for practitioners to be able to 
implement the model and calculate scores from open inputs. At this time fitting the model requires access to closed 
exploitation data. 
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variables where complete separation occurs (Allison, 2008). Since some data are highly unbalanced, 
many variables were never associated with (completely separated from) our minority class (exploited 
vulnerability) and these were removed. In Stage 2, we removed any variables that weren’t observed in at 
least 1% of the vulnerability data. Finally, in Stage 3, we reviewed the list of variables with domain 
experts and removed variables in order to ensure the model didn’t overfit to particular quirks of the 
dataset, and potentially introducing unnecessary bias. For example, several common web application 
vulnerabilities (cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery, directory traversal, input validation) will 
rarely have intrusion detection signatures written for each individual vulnerability, as they are easy to 
implement and are detected with a ‘class’ of signatures rather than for a specific vulnerability. This is a 
consequence of the way intrusion detection signatures are written (or not written), and is an area for future 
work for modelling exploitation. Table 1 shows the initial count of variables from our raw data (“Raw 
Count”), for each category of variable, and the number of variables that met the requirements for each 
stage of filtering (complete separation, proportion, and expert review).  
Category of variable Raw Count 
Stage 1: Complete 
Separation 
Stage 2: 
Proportion 
Stage 3: Expert 
Review 
Tags 166 111 46 35 
Vendors 3374 171 16 15 
References 45 28 16 1 
Weaponized code 1 1 1 1 
POC code 1 1 1 1 
Table 1: Count of Variables through each stage of filtering.  
Estimating the probability of exploited in the next 12 months 
Vulnerabilities are continually discovered and published.  As a result, our data contain vulnerabilities of 
both varying age and durations until exploitation.  To make the estimated probability normalized across 
all vulnerabilities, we established a 12-month time window after publication as a CVE, and only included 
vulnerabilities that had been observed for the full time period.  We selected the 12-month time window 
because this was the single common time-window encoded across the multiple data sources we collected 
on exploited vulnerabilities.  
In addition, this time period is empirically justified by research by Kenna Security and the Cyentia 
Institute which analyzed remediation data from almost 300 companies and discovered that the majority of 
vulnerabilities are remediated within the first year (median of 100 days, 75% of vulnerabilities were 
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remediated within 392 days of discovery) (Kenna 2019).  This suggests that the majority of remediation 
decisions and actions are taken within this time period. 
Estimating Model and Variable Selection 
As described, our interest is to estimate a binary outcome model that will predict the probability of a 
vulnerability being exploited within 12 months of being publicly disclosed. Additionally, we also wish to 
create a scoring system that is 1) simple to implement 2) interpretable 3) parsimonious and 4) performant. 
We therefore begin with a standard logistic regression as our estimating model.  
Including all possible features (variables) into a logistic regression -- while possible -- would not be 
parsimonious. Moreover, many of the features would provide little predictive power, or are highly 
correlated with other features. Both low information features and correlated features not only expand the 
size of the model, but may also lead to biased estimates. Therefore, we take a two step approach for 
identifying relevant features. First, we remove low information features (described above), and second, 
we use a regularized regression strategy to identify the concise set of features, while still ensuring good 
model performance. 
There are a number of different regularized regression techniques that could be employed (Hoerl 1970, 
Santos 1986, Zou 2005), with each introducing a penalty on the size of the coefficients in the model, 
inducing coefficients to be smaller and less likely to be statistically significant. We use the Elastic net 
model (Zou and Hastie, 2005), which introduces both a linear combination of  L​1​ and L​2​ penalty terms on 
the coefficients in the regression. A tuning parameter λ controls the strength of the regularization and 
allows for a family of models of increasing parsimony to be fit. Zou and Hastie (2005) provide a method 
for fitting coefficients that is less likely to introduce bias into coefficient estimates, which we employ 
here.  
Applying the first step of our feature selection process reduces the feature set considerably (see Table 1). 
The remaining features are then used to fit an Elastic net model with increasing values of  λ. For each 
model estimated we calculate several performance metrics including the Precision/Recall Area Under the 
Curve (PR AUC) and the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC).  We wish to maximize the value of the PR 
AUC and minimize the value of the BIC.  We use these metrics to identify the most parsimonious model 
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that still provides sufficient prediction. 
 
Figure 1: Results from elastic net regularization with BIC and PR AUC metrics 
Note: Upper Panel: a red (blue) colored feature reflects a positive (negative)            
correlation with probability of exploit. The color intensity reflects the strength of            
the coefficient estimate (not statistical significance). Lower Panel: the BIC and           
AUC curves show their respective performance metrics along the y-axes. The x            
axis in all plots represents the number of variables considered. 
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The results of this process can be seen in Figure 1.  The upper panel shows the 53 most significant 
features based on all available data and after filtering (2 exploit features, 36 tag features, and 15 vendor 
features).  The vertical dashed line in Figure 1 shows the optimal (minimized) value of BIC, which occurs 
with the first sixteen variables.  This represents the best tradeoff between performance and parsimony. 
Adding additional variables beyond that increases the BIC with nominal increases in the PR AUC.  
Of the final variables selected, 7 related to the software vendor (​VENDOR​: Microsoft, Adobe, HP, 
Apache, IBM, Apple, and Google), 2 related to exploit code (​EXPLOIT​: whether exploit code had been 
published, and whether exploit code had already been weaponized), and 6 related to properties of the 
vulnerability and impact (​TAG​: memory corruption, code execution, local, remote, and web), and the final 
variable is a count of the references (​REF​) in a published CVE.  The final set of 16 variables are shown in 
Table 2 along with descriptive statistics for each of the variables. Again, the overall percent of exploited 
vulnerabilities within our dataset is 3.7% (n = 25,159). 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Percent Exploited N 
POC Weaponized 37.1%  283 
Vend: Microsoft 21.2%  1,333 
POC Published 16.5%  2,212 
Vend: Adobe 15.9%  747 
Memory Corruption 11.7%  1,570 
Vend: HP 11.0%  308 
Vend: Apache 9.3%  354 
Vend: IBM 7.2%  1,202 
Code Execution 7.1%  7,278 
Denial of Service 5.6%  8,547 
Remote 5.4%  10,681 
Web 4.9% 5,317 
Local 3.5% 2,686 
Vend: Apple 0.8%  877 
Vend: Google 0.8%  1,852 
Ref. Count Avg Exploited: 5.3% Avg Not Exploited: 3.7%  25,159 
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Our estimating model therefore becomes, 
Pr[exploitation]​i​ = ​f(​𝛼​0​ + ​𝛼​v​VENDOR​i​ +  𝛼​T​EXPLOIT​i​ + 𝛼​E​TAG​i​  + 𝛼​R​REF​i​  + ε​i​) Eq. 1 
Where, ​VENDOR ​is a vector of binary (dummy) variables related to the most frequently exploited 
software vendors, as described above. ​EXPLOIT ​is vector of binary variables related to the exploit code, 
TAG ​is a vector of variables related to characteristics of the vulnerability itself and ​REF​ is the log value of 
1 plus the count of references in the published CVE. ε is the random error term, assumed to be 
independent of the observed covariates. Identification of the variables of interest comes from the portion 
of vulnerabilities for which exploits have been observed in the wild. 
Results 
The results of estimating Eq. 1 are shown in Table 3. 
Variable LogOdds Standard Error 
vend:microsoft  2.44​*** 0.111 
vend:ibm   2.07​*** 0.138 
exp:weaponized   2.00​*** 0.164 
vend:adobe  1.91​*** 0.136 
vend:hp  1.62​*** 0.213 
exp:poc code  1.50​*** 0.091 
vend:apache  1.10​*** 0.231 
ref:count  1.01​*** 0.078 
tag:code execution  0.57​*** 0.096 
tag:remote  0.23​** 0.089 
tag:denial of service  0.22​* 0.098 
tag:web  0.06 0.091 
tag:memory corruption -0.20 0.126 
tag:local -0.63​*** 0.143 
vend:google -0.89​** 0.280 
vend:apple -1.92​*** 0.399 
(Intercept) -6.18 0.143 
Significance of p-value:  *** <0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05 
Table 3: Regression Results 
These results are also displayed graphically in Fig 2. 
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Fig 2: Graphical regression results 
Proof of concept ​exploits being published and especially being ​weaponized ​(built into an exploitation 
framework) is clearly correlated to the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited. Among the 
vendors, the two most significantly correlated with the probability of exploitation are ​Microsoft ​and ​IBM​. 
The ​Microsoft ​variable is likely a reflection of the ubiquitousness of Microsoft products (operating 
systems, and desktop and server applications), as well as a long history of being targeted for exploitation. 
The ​IBM ​variable appears to be related to a handful of exploited and widely used products being led by 
their flagship Websphere application. The ​Adobe ​variable appears due to its Acrobat product, which has 
had a long history of vulnerabilities. The ​HP​ variable is similar to ​IBM ​with a small handful of widely 
used products.  
Vendor variables that were found to be negatively correlated with exploit include ​Google​ and ​Apple​.  The 
presence of ​Google ​is likely due to its adoption and integrated relationship with the CVE process which 
increases the amount of Google vulnerabilities that receive a CVE ID.  The result of this integration is that 
Google has many published vulnerabilities (more than Microsoft) and yet very few are observed to be 
exploited. ​Apple ​is a closed platform and is traditionally less targeted by exploit writers. Vulnerability 
attributes (tags) tend to influence the probability of exploit less than other categories, but clearly a ​remote 
code execution ​increases the probability of exploit more than a ​local memory corruption ​vulnerability. 
Finally, the ​count of references ​published with a CVE is also positively correlated with the probability of 
exploit, and may have a strong effect. For example, CVE-2019-0708 (also known as “BlueKeep”, which 
received a rare “cybersecurity advisory” from  the NSA recommending the vulnerability be addressed) 
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has 10 unique references published in the CVE. By comparison, just 4% of CVEs have 10 or more 
references, in our sample data set.  
Model Validation and Robustness Checking 
The overall approach was validated by splitting the sample data by using a rolling forecasting origin 
technique (Hyndman and Athanasopoulos, 2013).  This sets up a rolling window across the sample data 
where the training data always occurs prior to the hold-out test data.This is useful in the case of 
vulnerabilities because we want to validate how it performs on ​future​ vulnerabilities. One drawback is 
that we cannot use the full data set for validation as would be possible in a randomized cross-validation 
process (see below, we do this for comparison).  
Figure 3 shows the performance of the model on the features discussed in the previous section with solid 
blue lines. The left panel in Figure 3 is the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve which plots the 
false positive rate against the true positive rate and the more the curve pushes into the upper left, the 
better the performance of the model. We included a dashed line that represents a random strategy. On the 
right side of Figure 3 we are showing the Precision/Recall curve (efficiency/coverage). The more this line 
pushes to the upper right, the better the performance of the model. Again, there is a dashed line showing 
the performance of a purely random strategy.  
 
Figure 3: Model Performance with a time-based split 
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Comparison to CVSS 
For comparison, we can compute the true and false positives along with the true and false negatives for a 
purely CVSS strategy on our sample data set.  From these metrics we can compute the true positive rate 
(TPR), false positive rate (FPR), efficiency and coverage.  True positive rate is computed as the true 
positives over the amount of exploited vulnerabilities (true positive + false negatives) and the false 
positive rate is computed as the false positives over the non-exploited vulnerabilities (false positives + 
true negatives).  Efficiency (precision) is computed from the true positives over the level of effort (true 
positives + false positives).  Coverage is computed as the True Positives over the amount of exploited 
vulnerabilities (true positive + false negatives).  
Base Score False Negatives 
False 
Positives 
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
TPR FPR Efficiency 
(Precision) 
Coverage 
(Recall) 
CVSS 10+ 235 391 5,883 41 15.1% 4.6% 9.5% 14.9% 
CVSS 9+ 207 744 5,530 69 31.5% 12% 8.5% 25.0% 
CVSS 8+ 141 1,517 4,757 135 51% 25.2% 8.2% 48.9% 
CVSS 7+ 103 2,600 3,674 173 64.9% 43.8% 6.2% 62.7% 
CVSS 6+ 99 3,110 3,164 177 67.3% 49.9% 5.4% 64.1% 
CVSS 5+ 58 4,248 2,026 218 79.3% 67.2% 4.9% 79.0% 
CVSS 4+ 9 5,974 300 267 96.4% 94.8% 4.3% 96.7% 
Table 4: Measurements for CVSS performance 
This now sets up a direct comparison between EPSS and CVSS.  Figure 4 repeats the ROC curve and PR 
curve from Figure 3, but includes the computed metrics (in red points) for several different CVSS-based 
strategies.  Our model is clearly outperforming CVSS on both sets of metrics.  
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 Figure 4: Model Performance with a time-based split and CVSS performance 
 Since most security practitioners (and companies) would like to maximize coverage in the most efficient 
way. We can compare the effort it would take to match the coverage of a CVSS-based strategy against the 
performance of EPSS.  The level of effort in the CVSS approach can be found by adding the True 
Positive and the False Positives. 
Base Score Coverage CVSS Effort EPSS Effort EPSS Cutoff  11 Reduction in Effort 
CVSS 10+ 14.9% 432 61 44.1% 85.9% 
CVSS 9+ 25.0% 813 181 19.8% 77.7% 
CVSS 8+ 48.9% 1,652 738 5.8% 55.3% 
CVSS 7+ 62.7% 2,773 1,091 3.68% 60.7% 
CVSS 6+ 64.1% 3,287 1,174 3.35% 64.3% 
CVSS 5+ 79.0% 4,466 1,712 1.71% 61.7% 
CVSS 4+ 96.7% 6,241 4,443 0.54% 28.8% 
Table 5: Level of effort for equivalent coverage between our model and CVSS 
 
11 The “cutoff” is the value at which all vulnerabilities above would be prioritized and all those below would be 
delayed. 
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Figure 5: Reduction in Effort, matching Coverage: EPSS vs CVSS Score  
Calibration and Distribution 
Given that the output is a probability, we can construct a calibration plot (sometimes referred to as a 
reliability plot).  By binning the predicted probability and measuring the proportion of those observed to 
be exploited we generate the left-hand side of figure 6.  The dashed line represents perfect calibration 
(when the model predicts 20% chance of exploitation we should expect 20% of those to be exploited).  As 
figure 6 shows, the model is fairly well-calibrated. The predicted values (solid line) follow the calibrated 
line (dashed line), and generally fall within the 95% confidence interval in the lightly shaded region of the 
calibration plot.  
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 Figure 6: Reduction in Effort, matching Coverage: EPSS vs CVSS Score  
The right hand side of Figure 6 shows the overall distribution of predicted values as a density plot. Note 
this is on the log scale to amplify the lower end of the prediction range as 76% of the predictions are 2% 
or less. While the density shows that there is a clear separation in the estimated probabilities between 
vulnerabilities that were observed to be exploited and those that were not, it is not a perfect separation. 
The description statistics about the distribution of predicted values is shown in Table 6. 
 Min. 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max 
Overall 0.03% 0.4% 0.8% 3.0% 1.9% 92.1% 
Not Exploited 0.03% 0.4% 0.7% 2.5% 1.6% 92.1% 
Exploited 0.3% 2.1% 5.7% 15.4% 19.8% 80.7% 
Table 6: Summary statistics for the distributions of predicted values 
Randomized 5-fold Cross-Validation 
While randomized cross-validation can generate predictions across the entire sample data, it may be 
misleading with time-series data as we discussed previously.  If the underlying system is shifting over 
time, historical observations may not be strong predictors of future outcome. We include this here as a 
comparison and to explore the outcome if time were not factored into model validation.  Figure 7 shows a 
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five-fold cross-validation for both the ROC and AUC curve.  Again, the CVSS-based approach is shown 
as points on the same scale. 
 
Figure 7: Model Performance with randomized cross-validation splits and CVSS performance 
Focusing on Existing Vulnerabilities 
Because Kenna Security works with hundreds of enterprises - in their vulnerability management 
programs, we can see that not all CVEs are a concern for companies. In fact, only 44% of the CVE’s 
published in the two-year time window of this study were ever reported as open in a corporate 
environment. This occurs for two reasons: not all software is used by enterprises, and not all 
vulnerabilities have scanner signatures written for them. The subset we study here are CVEs which have 
detection signatures written by vulnerability management scan vendors, and have occurrences of these 
scans in the wild. By focusing on just the vulnerabilities that the vulnerability scanners are reporting to 
companies we may get a more realistic picture of what companies could experience by implementing 
EVSS.  
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 Figure 8: Model Performance with time-based splits on open/scanned vulnerabilities  
 
The ROC curve on the left does not see much of an improvement, but the PR curve on the right does get 
some lift in the middle portion of the curve. One reason for this could be that the scanner vendors and 
corporate environments are focused on popular vendors and technologies, for which we have robust data, 
and more data earlier on.   
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Formalizing and Implementing the EPSS 
Next we consider an example vulnerability and we compute the estimated probability of exploitation 
within the first 12 months after publishing. First step is to compute the log odds which is a cumulative 
sum of the observations about a vulnerability multiplied by the coefficients from the model.  Therefore, 
using the results presented in Table 3, the log odds can be computed as, 
LogOdds = -6.18 +  
 2.44  * vend:microsoft + 
 2.07  * vend:ibm + 
 2.00  * exp:weaponized + 
 1.91  * vend:adobe + 
 1.62  * vend:hp + 
 1.50  * exp:poc code + 
 1.10  * vend:apache + 
 1.01  * log(ref:count + 1) + 
 0.57  * tag:code execution + 
 0.23  * tag:remote + 
 0.22  * tag:denial of service + 
 0.06  * tag:web + 
-0.20  * tag:memory corruption + 
-0.63  * tag:local + 
-0.89  * vend:google + 
-1.92  * vend:apple                                         Eq. 2 
 
Where each variable on the right hand side of Equation 2 is encoded as a 1 or 0 depending on if the 
attribute is present (1) or not (0) in the vulnerability, with the exception of the reference count which is a 
continuous variable transformed by adding 1 and taking the log (adding one accounts for the possibility 
that the reference count may be zero).  
Additionally, the LogOdds value is converted into the estimated probability of exploitation as, 
    Pr[exploitation] = 1/(1+e​-LogOdds​) Eq. 3 
For example, consider CVE-2019-0708, also known as “BlueKeep”, which was published Nov 26th, 2018 
(several months after our sample window).  It was (is) a widely discussed weakness in Microsoft’s 
Remote Desktop that allow remote code execution with attributes as shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Regression Results for CVE-2019-0708 
Variable Coefficient Observations  
(Intercept) -6.18 1 (always) -6.18 
vend:microsoft  2.44 1  2.44 
vend:ibm   2.07 0  0 
exp:weaponized   2.00 1  2.00 
vend:adobe  1.91 0 0 
vend:hp  1.62 0 0 
exp:poc code  1.50 1  1.50 
vend:apache  1.10 0 0 
ref:count  1.01 log(10 + 1) = 2.4 2.424 
tag:code execution  0.57 1  0.57 
tag:remote  0.23 1  0.23 
tag:denial of service  0.22 0 0 
tag:web  0.06 0 0 
tag:memory corruption -0.20 0 0 
tag:local -0.63 0 0 
vend:google -0.89 0 0 
vend:apple -1.92 0 0 
sum: 2.984 
 
Simplifying Table 5 into a singular equation, 
log odds =  -6.18 + 2.44 + 2 + 1.5 + 2.424 + 0.57 + 0.23  =  2.984. 
Now we apply Equation 3, 
Pr[exploitation] = 1/(1+e​-2.984​) = 1 / (1 + 0.05059007) = 0.952 = 95.2% 
Therefore this model predicts that the probability of CVE-2019-0708 being exploited within 12 months of 
being published is approximately 95%.  As a point of reference, this CVE was the single highest rated in 
the twelve months following the data sample used in model training.  
Discussion and Limitations  
We are striving to create an approach that is 1) simple to implement 2) implementable with open data 3) 
interpretable 4) parsimonious and 5) performant.  We necessarily had to make concessions based on 
limitations in the data and the practicalities of implementation by keeping the variables included as small 
as possible. 
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Necessarily, the model we present here is built using outcome data (exploitation in the wild) that is not 
freely available. The predictions are based on observed exploit data identified by standard signature-based 
intrusion detection systems, and may therefore be subject to missed exploit activity. That is, we do not 
observe, and therefore cannot make predictions about, exploits that were launched, but not observed. 
There are any number of reasons why an exploit may not be observed: no IDS signature had not been 
created or it occurred in locations or networks where we had no visibility. We are also limited to the time 
window of vulnerabilities used. Given that we bound the prediction to a 12 month window, we 
necessarily must restrict data collection to omit observations newer than this period. 
We use a variety of sources to get as close as possible to the most holistic picture of exploitation. The 
closed (and closely guarded nature) of exploitation data prevents us from using fully open data to measure 
exploitation. Our goal is to create an implementable, model which accepts open and freely available 
inputs and not necessarily one that could be trained from scratch using open data. If security practitioners, 
firms, or security vendors work with vulnerabilities, we encourage them to contribute to this or similar 
research efforts.  Improvements in data collection, specifically around signature generation, deployment 
and activity will have a direct and correlated improvement on the accuracy of the models.  Additionally, 
improved data collection about the vulnerabilities and the context in which they exist should also improve 
future modeling efforts. Lastly, additional exploitation event data should be correlated to CVE, allowing 
researchers to combine outcome events into larger datasets. 
The EPSS model is attempting to capture and predict an outcome within an ever-evolving and complex 
system.  Despite this complex and ever evolving landscape, EPSS makes remarkably good predictions 
with a simple, interpretable linear model. Its simplicity means that it is easy to distribute and be built into 
existing infrastructures. EPSS’s structure also allows for the easy creation and interpretation of 
counterfactuals, e.g. “how much do we expect the probability to increase if proof of concept code is 
released?”. It is clear that any model of vulnerability exploitations will need to evolve with the underlying 
vulnerability landscape. EPSS will likely experience a decay in performance as time passes and will 
require updates and retraining over time. But with time and collaboration, there exists opportunities for 
the generation of specific models.  Research focused around specific vendors or on classes of 
vulnerabilities would yield a more accurate prioritization system.  
We believe a key advantage to EPSS is that it can be augmented and improved. EPSS is created to be as 
parsimonious as possible while still maintaining performance, but that doesn’t preclude future 
augmentation. Augmentation can come in the form of more sources of exploitation, new vulnerability 
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features, and longer time periods of analysis. As more kinds of disparate data – data for which we have 
not even considered – become available, this could allow us to further refine and improve the model, 
identifying either new or stronger correlations. For example, it is conceivable that data from social media 
platforms, or vulnerability scan data from additional corporate networks could provide useful inferences. 
future research in machine learning techniques may provide model techniques and  allow us to make 
better coefficient estimates.  
We are clear to restrict the context of our scoring system to provide estimates of threats, rather than true 
risks. That is, we recognize that while the severity of a vulnerability is characterized by CVSS, and this 
scoring system characterizes the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited, neither of these, nor the 
combination of them, represent a complete measure of risk because we do not observe nor incorporate 
firm-level information regarding a firm’s assets, its operating environment, or any compensating security 
controls. In addition, we provide no information regarding the cost of patching vulnerabilities, as these are 
firm-dependent expenses. 
We only consider vulnerabilities that have been assigned CVE identifiers since the CVE identifiers 
represent a common identification mechanism employed across our disparate data sources.  Adoption 
and/or consideration of alternative vulnerability databases was not feasible as the data collection sources 
did not include references to them. While we would have liked to account for and model all 
vulnerabilities discovered, the lack of a common identification method made data aggregation 
improbable.  As a result, we omit other kinds of software (or hardware) flaws or misconfigurations that 
may also be exploited. Though, it is possible that these may be incorporated into future versions of this 
scoring system if data sources enabled it.  
It is conceivable that by disclosing information about which vulnerabilities are more likely to be 
exploited, based on past information, that this may change the strategic behavior of malicious hackers to 
select vulnerabilities that would be less likely to be noticed and detected, thereby artificially altering the 
vulnerability exploit ecosystem. We believe this is suggestive, at best, but is something that we will seek 
to identify and minimize.  
Conclusion 
This work undoubtedly represents an early step in vulnerability prioritization research.  Hopefully the 
benefit of this work has become evident and may motivate additional research in this area.  Vulnerability 
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research will (and should) begin with the data. EPSS was conceived out of a recognition by experienced 
security practitioners and researchers that current methods for assessing the risk of a software 
vulnerability are based on limited information that is, for the most part, uninformed by real-world 
empirical data. For example, while CVSS is capturing the immutable characteristics of a vulnerability in 
order to communicate a measure of ​severity​, it has been misunderstood and misapplied as a measure of 
risk​. In some sense, however, this could have been expected. Humans suffer from many cognitive biases, 
which cause us to apply basic heuristics in order to manage complex decisions.  And this craving for a 12
simplistic representation of information security risk is often satiated when we’re presented with a ​single 
number, ​ranging from 0 to 10.  
But we must do better. We must understand that security risk is not reducible to a single value (a CVSS 
score). Nor is the entirety of security risk contained in both CVSS and EPSS scores. But so far this is 
what we have. Until we acquire new data, techniques and/or methods, we must consider how EPSS (the 
probability of exploitation) and CVSS (an ordinal numerical scale that reflects a set of characteristics of 
vulnerability severity) may coexist.  To that end, let us consider three  approaches. 
A first approach could be to substitute EPSS for CVSS entirely within all decision-making policies. Since 
they both produce bounded, numerical scores that could be scaled identically, substitution could be simple 
and straightforward. The concern with this approach, however, is that (as previously discussed) threat is 
also  just one component of risk, and this strategy would ignore all the qualities captured by a severity 
score. 
Second, a keen practitioner may be drawn to simply multiple the CVSS score by the EPSS probability in 
order to produce a number that measures the ​severity ​* ​threat ​of a vulnerability -- and hope this becomes 
a better (closer) measure of risk. While intuitively, this may feel appropriate, logically and 
mathematically, it is not. Applying mathematical operations to combine the probability of exploitation 
against an ordinal value is faulty and should be avoided.  
A third approach would be to recognize that CVSS and EPSS each communicate orthogonal pieces of 
information about a vulnerability, and instead of mashing them together mathematically, to consider the 
values together, but separately. At a first approximation, it is clear that high severity ​and ​high probability 
12 For example, consider bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), the notion that we find many ways of simplifying 
complex decision by making simplifying assumptions. And see 
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/every-single-cognitive-bias/​ for a list of all documented cognitive biases. 
Last accessed July 25, 2019. 
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vulnerabilities should be prioritized first within an organization. Similarly, low severity ​and ​low 
probability vulnerabilities could be deprioritized within an organization. What remains are the 
unclassified vulnerabilities that require additional consideration of the environment, systems and 
information involved. While likely unsatisfying as a complete risk management decision framework, we 
believe this is unavoidable, yet realistic. 
We, the authors of this paper, do not yet have the perfect or final solution. We recognize that enterprises 
are massive vessels, that have developed policies and practices to suit their culture and capabilities over 
many years. And changing course would take much effort, even when a preferred direction has been 
identified. However, augmenting existing policies with the information that EPSS provides, to any of the 
previously described degrees, can increase the efficiency of existing policies, and pave the way for 
systemic re-evaluations of these policies. 
While we believe that EPSS provides a fundamental and material contribution to enterprise security risk 
management and national cyber security policymaking, the implementation of this threat scoring system 
will be an evolving practice. It is our genuine hope and desire, therefore, that EPSS will provide useful 
and defensible threat information that has never before been available.  
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